SUBJECT: IMMUNITY FOR MUSHARRAF LIKELY AFTER ZARDARI’S ELECTION AS
PRESIDENT REF: (A) ISLAMABAD 2742 (B) ISLAMABAD 2741 Classified By: Anne
W. Patterson, for reasons 1.4 (b)(d) ¶1. (C) Summary. In separate
meetings with Asif Zardari, PM Gilani and Chief of Army Staff Kayani,
Ambassador pressed for quick action on immunity for former President
Musharraf. Zardari and Gilani said flatly that they were committed to
providing immunity, but not until after the presidential election (now
scheduled for September 6). Pushing immunity now, they believed, could
jeopardize Zardari’s candidacy. Kayani expressed concern that if
immunity becomes tied up with the ongoing debate over the judges’
future, it may never happen. Zardari plans to continue to slow roll
action on the judges’ restoration but remains confident that Nawaz
Sharif will not walk out of the coalition. Nawaz’s deadlines for action
on the judges continue to pass unfulfilled; the next one is scheduled
for August 27. The decision by the Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM) August
20 to back Zardari for President has strengthened Zardari’s hand
against Nawaz. Nawaz is left with the option of walking out of the
coalition but having little prospect of forcing a new general election
in the short term. Zardari is walking tall these days, hopefully not too
tall to forget his promise to Kayani and to us on an immunity deal. End
Summary. ¶2. (C) Ambassador met with Pakistan People’s Party (PPP)
leader Asif Zardari on August 23, with PM Gilani on August 21, and with
COAS Kayani on August 20. ¶3. (C) Zardari told Ambassador August 23 that
he was committed to indemnity for Musharraf. Ambassador stressed that
only the promise of indemnity had persuaded Musharraf to step down as
President. We believed, as we had often said, that Musharraf should have
a dignified retirement and not be hounded out of the country. Zardari
cited a British anecdote about the Spanish empire and said “tell the
most powerful man in the world that there is no way that I would go back
on what I have said.” Zardari noted that he already had firmly
committed to the U.S., the UK, and Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Kayani
that indemnity for Musharraf would be forthcoming. Ambassador urged him
to do it quickly. Zardari said flatly that to do it before he was
elected President would lose him votes, but he would do both the
legislation and a presidential pardon as soon as he was elected. Zardari
revealed that former President Musharraf had approached Chief Justice
Dogar about issuing a restraining order against the impeachment motion,
but Dogar had refused. Zardari also alleged that Musharraf had planned
to replace COAS Kayani if Dogar had blocked the impeachment. 4. (C)
Zardari said he was trying to keep Nawaz in the coalition and was candid
that he planned to tie up the judges issue for a long time. He said the
parliament would debate the restoration of the judges; Chief Justice
Dogar would then submit some rulings on the restoration of the judges;
all this could take months. In the meantime, he was trying to persuade
former Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry to become Governor of
Balochistan. (Note: In a move clearly orchestrated by Zardari, the
Governor Magsi of Balochistan resigned on August 20, making it possible
to offer the position to Chaudhry.) ¶5. (C) Zardari said he did not
think Nawaz would leave the coalition, but he admitted the Pakistan
Muslim League-Nawaz had become increasingly testy. He said that he had
already agreed with Nawaz to curtail the powers of the President and
then allow Nawaz to be eligible for a third term as Prime Minister; both
measures would require constitutional amendments. Zardari revealed that
he also had leverage over Shahbaz Sharif, who through paperwork snafus,
had been technically elected illegally for a third term as Chief
Minister. This, too, would have to be resolved in parliament, Zardari
said. “So I can give them something they want,” noted Zardari, “that’s
what politics is all about.” Kayani Worried -------------- ¶6. (C)
After an August 20 meeting with visiting S/CT Coordinator Dell Dailey,
Kayani asked Ambassador to stay behind and discuss his concerns that
Zardari was delaying ISLAMABAD 00002802 002 OF 003 Musharraf,s immunity
bill. Kayani had heard the large meeting of coalition partners (chaired
August 19 by the newly returned Bilawal Bhutto) had discussed mostly the
judges. Then they decided to take a 72-hour “break” to consult party
members. ¶7. (C) As post earlier reported (Reftels), Kayani said he took
Zardari,s commitments to now ex-President Musharraf as the most
important argument in persuading him to resign. Zardari made very
specific commitments to Kayani. Now, for Zardari to delay, it makes him
(Kayani) look bad within his own institution “and I have to bring the
Army along with me.” Kayani also noted that the delay does nothing for
Zardari,s reputation for trustworthiness. If this issue gets conflated
with the judges and with Zardari,s own desires to be President, it will
become too complicated to pass, Kayani said. Gilani on Immunity, Bajaur,
Subsidies ------------------------------------- ¶8. (C) Ambassador met
with PM Gilani and Interior Minister Rehman Malik for thirty minutes
August 21, after a graduation ceremony for U.S. trained members of his
protective detail. He had been briefed about PDAS Camp’s discussion with
Ambassador Haqqani. ¶9. (C) Gilani said the PPP was going to provide
immunity for ex-President Musharraf, but timing was important. They were
afraid that putting forward immunity legislation would lose them votes
for Asif Zardari,s presidential campaign. Ambassador pressed on this
issue, saying that Musharraf would never have agreed to resign without
the promise of immunity. He assured Ambassador that he and the party did
not want vengeance. Regarding immunity, Gilani said “many will say that
we have done a deal with America, but still I understand that we have
to do it.” ¶10. (C) Regarding the ongoing military operation on Bajaur
(in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas), Gilani assured Ambassador
that it will continue “to its conclusion,” i.e., until all the militants
were driven out. Gilani said the next step would be to go after Taliban
leader Baitullah Mehsud. Gilani wanted President Bush to know that over
500 militants had been killed in the operation and that the GOP had
reached out to NATO (during General Kayani’s recent visit to Afghanistan
for a tripartite meeting). He said Pakistan would do everything
possible to encourage cooperation between the U.S. and Pakistani
militaries. Gilani noted that Pakistan was using its F-16 aircraft to
fight the militants and thanked the U.S. for providing funding for the
F-16 mid-life upgrades. However, Gilani pleaded for urgent U.S.
assistance in providing relief for displaced people around Bajaur and
noted that fighting was spreading to neighboring Mohmand Agency. ¶11.
(C) Malik suggested we hold off alleged Predator attacks until after the
Bajaur operation. The PM brushed aside Rehman,s remarks and said “I
don,t care if they do it as long as they get the right people. We,ll
protest in the National Assembly and then ignore it.” (Note: The strike
has been front page news, but the media is reporting that the targets
were nests of Arab fighters.) ¶12. (C) Gilani said it would be almost
politically impossible to reduce fuel subsidies (raise prices) in the
short term along the lines Deputy Secretary Kimmitt had suggested to the
Finance Minister. The coalition had restoration of the deposed judges,
immunity for Musharraf, and the election of the new president on their
plate. They were already taking enormous heat for previous fuel price
increases. ¶13. (C) Comment: Nawaz may increasingly be considering
leaving the coalition in the center and consolidating his hold in the
Punjab because he cannot engineer a new general election in the short
term. The addition of MQM’s support leaves Nawaz with less leverage over
Zardari in the current coalition. The fight over Iftikhar Chaudhry
probably is based on Nawaz’s expectation that Chaudhry would rule in
both Nawaz’s and Shahbaz’s favor in pending court cases ISLAMABAD
00002802 003 OF 003 challenging their ability to run as candidates in
the National and Punjab Assemblies respectively. Until he can sit in the
National Assembly, Nawaz cannot be Prime Minister. PATTERSON
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